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Abstract: 
The paper analyses the monetary policy operations of central banks in the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA). We distinguish the pattern of monetary policy operations of the liquidity providing 
central banks of the large industrialized countries (creditor central banks) and the liquidity absorb-
ing central banks of emerging market economies (debtor central banks). Many debtor central banks 
provide liquidity through foreign exchange intervention in reaction to foreign exchange inflows. If 
the respective liquidity expansion is regarded as a threat to domestic price and financial stability, 
liquidity is partly absorbed through sterilization operations. The paper finds that most MENA coun-
tries are debtor central banks due to a general pattern of excessive liquidity creation as well as due 
to country specific reasons. 
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1. Introduction 
During the first half of the new millennium the world experienced historically low levels of interest 
rates. Starting from 1999 the Bank of Japan kept the Japanese interest rate at zero to reactivate the 
ailing Japanese economy. After the burst of the IT-bubble in the year 2000, the Federal Reserve cut 
the federal funds rate to historically low levels and only started to increase interest rates during the 
year 2004. Albeit to a lesser extend, the European Central Bank also reduced interest rates consid-
erably and only started to increase interest rates during the year 2006.  
The liquidity conditions in the large industrial countries in North America, East Asia and Europe 
had a strong impact on the emerging market economies. As the economic activity in the industrial-
ized countries was (comparatively) weak and interest rates were low, investors discovered invest-
ment opportunities in the emerging markets where interest rates tended to be high(er). Driven by 
this “hunt for yield”, some emerging markets experienced an unprecedented degree of capital in-
flows. In other emerging markets and developing countries, foreign exchange inflows were driven 
by the global increase of commodity prices and thereby high export revenues.  
The impacts of strong foreign exchange inflows into emerging market economies are diverse. While 
foreign exchange inflows contribute to lower interest rates and thereby higher investment, con-
sumption and growth, monetary authorities may also face the threat of overinvestment, inflation and 
overheating. Then central banks may be inclined to absorb surplus liquidity from the domestic fi-
nancial system to prevent risks to price and financial stability.  
As will be shown in this paper the central banks of emerging market economies can use a broad 
variety of instruments to withdraw liquidity from the markets. Whichever instrument is used, there 
will be an asymmetric pattern of monetary policy in large industrialized countries and small emerg-
ing market economies While the first ones are liquidity providing (creditor central banks), the latter 
ones are liquidity absorbing which we will call debtor central banks.  
In part 2 we will characterize the asymmetric world monetary system and its impact on exchange 
rate and monetary policies. We explain in general the reasoning for becoming debtor and creditor 
central banks. The case studies in part 3 will show how central banks in countries of the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) conduct monetary policy operations in this environment. Section 4 
concludes. 
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2. Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies by Creditor and Debtor Central Banks 
2.1 The asymmetric nature of the world currency system 
McKinnon and Schnabl (2004a, 2004b) stress the asymmetric nature of the world currency system. 
While the United States as the issuer of the most important international currency pursue an inde-
pendent monetary policy, most countries outside Europe tend to stabilize exchange rates against the 
dollar. A similar situation applies to the euro area and its periphery. The European Central Bank is 
fully independent in monetary policy making, while at periphery of the European Monetary Union 
the euro is widely used as an intervention, reserve, and pegging currency (ECB 2007).  
The central banks of large countries issuing international currencies such as the European Central 
Bank and the Federal Reserve seldom participate in foreign exchange markets. Interest rate deci-
sions are focused on domestic inflation, growth and interest rate smoothing. The exchange rate is 
(widely) left to market forces. Foreign exchange intervention takes place occasionally to calm “dis-
orderly market conditions”1. The large countries issuing international currencies can float their cur-
rencies freely for mainly two reasons. First, in large closed economies long-term fluctuations in the 
exchange rate level affect a comparatively small part of the economy. Second, highly developed 
capital markets provide a broad variety of instruments to hedge the foreign exchange risk of short-
term payment flows.  
In contrast, McKinnon and Schnabl (2004a, 2004b) provide the rationale for exchange rate stabili-
zation in small open economies with underdeveloped capital markets. They argue that emerging 
markets and developing countries cannot choose their monetary framework exogenously based on 
specific targets of economic policy making. Rather, the regime choice is endogenous, determined 
by several inherent and interdependent factors such as macroeconomic stabilization, international 
trade, and the currency denomination of international capital flows.  
In many emerging market and developing countries exchange rate pegs help anchoring both infla-
tion and inflation expectations and are an important tool for domestic price stabilization. Even if 
low inflation in principle can be achieved within inflation targeting frameworks, exchange rate 
volatility feeds into domestic macroeconomic instability in small and open economies (McKinnon 
1963): As world market prices can be assumed to be given and imported goods take a large share in 
domestic prices, stabilizing exchange rates is equivalent to stabilizing the domestic price level.  
 4
 Exchange rate stabilization in emerging markets and developing countries is also motivated from 
international goods markets as transaction costs for international trade decline. From this perspec-
tive fixed exchange rates are particularly important for small open economies with a high share of 
international trade as percent of GDP as well as for highly integrated economic regions with strong 
intra-regional trade linkages such as Europe and East Asia (McKinnon and Schnabl 2004a). In this 
context, also invoicing habits matter.  
While trade of the large industrialized countries tends to be invoiced in domestic currencies, trade 
of emerging markets is overwhelmingly invoiced in international currency. Given this phenomenon 
of “external currency pricing” (Cook and Devereux 2006) (real) exchange rate devaluations fail to 
have an expansionary impact on the economy through rising exports, because exports are not immedi-
ately more competitive. While exports remain constant over the short term, imports collapse due to a 
rapid pass-through of the exchange rate change into import prices. As import volumes remain constant 
over the short term, nominal imports increase and the external balance deteriorates. Furthermore, over 
the longer term the depreciation will reduce the import demand of a country for imports. Therefore, 
there is an additional incentive to keep exchange rates stable.   
Finally, underdeveloped capital markets as they are prevalent in emerging markets and development 
economies (Eichengreen and Hausmann 1999) provide an incentive for exchange rate stabilization. 
Due to a long tradition of inflation and depreciation, which have partially resulted in a high degree 
of dollarization or euroization of the respective economies, banks and enterprises can not use the 
domestic currency to borrow or to lend internationally. International investors and debtors are un-
willing to accept liabilities and assets denominated in local currencies. The foreign exchange risk of 
net international debt and assets remains widely unhedged.  
The monetary authorities can provide a substitute for fragmented capital markets by exchange rate 
stabilization (McKinnon and Schnabl 2004a, 2004b). From a short-term perspective, reducing day-
to-day exchange rate volatilities softens the risk for short-term payments flows. From a more long-
term perspective, fixed exchanges rates contribute to macroeconomic and financial stability as fluc-
tuations in the exchange rate level constitute a risk for the balance sheets of banks and enterprises. 
In particular, in the case of liability dollarization, sharp depreciations lead to an increase in liabili-
                                                                                                                                                                  
1  The Federal Reserve defines disorderly market conditions as rapid exchange rate changes as well as cases when the 
exchange rate does not reflect fundamental economic conditions (http://www.ny.frb.org/aboutthe-
fed/fedpoint/fed44.html).  
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ties in terms of domestic currency. In highly euroized countries with a high stock of foreign debt 
such as for instance Croatia, the incentive to avoid sharp exchange rate fluctuations is even stronger 
(Chmelarova and Schnabl 2006).2
The asymmetric incentive for exchange rate stabilization in anchor currency countries and in 
emerging market countries is reflected in both the balance sheets of central banks and in the work-
ing mechanisms of monetary policies. While the European Central Bank und the Federal Reserve 
(henceforth creditor central banks) provide liquidity in their open market operations (OMOs), cen-
tral banks of emerging market economies (henceforth debtor central banks) mainly supply liquidity 
by intervening in the foreign exchange market (i.e. by purchasing foreign assets). If the liquidity 
supply resulting in foreign exchange intervention is regarded as “excessive”, debtor central banks 
will absorb part of the liquidity by sterilization operations.  
A creditor central bank faces a liquidity deficit in the domestic banking system, whereas a debtor 
central bank faces a liquidity surplus. The definition of a liquidity deficit or surplus and therefore 
the definition of a creditor or debtor central bank crucially depends on the definition of autonomous 
factors. Autonomous factors affect liquidity and thus, they affect commercial banks’ deposits held 
at the central bank, however, they do not belong to the monetary policy operations of the central 
bank.3 They can be determined by the behaviour of the public, as in the case of banknotes in circu-
lation, or by exchange rate objectives of the central bank, as net foreign assets change due to foreign 
exchange interventions. The fact that the sum of the autonomous factors is larger on the liability 
side than on the asset side of the central bank balance sheet implies that the central bank faces a 
liquidity deficit in the domestic banking system and vice versa in case of a liquidity surplus.  
If, for example, net foreign assets are the only liquidity-providing autonomous factor and banknotes 
in circulation are the only liquidity-absorbing autonomous factor, the central bank will be in a credi-
tor position, if banknotes in circulation exceed net foreign assets. In contrast, net foreign assets will 
exceed banknotes in circulation in case of a debtor central bank. A creditor central bank, therefore, 
will supply liquidity in its regular monetary policy operations by providing new balances on banks’ 
deposits at the central bank, with which banks can refinance their business operations. In contrast, 
the debtor central bank in this example has already supplied excess liquidity by foreign exchange 
interventions and therefore needs to absorb liquidity by its monetary policy operations, i.e. steriliza-
                                                 
2    In contrast, countries which are able to hold international debt and assets in domestic currencies such as the US and 
the euro area, exchange rate fluctuations leave the balance sheet of domestic banks and enterprises widely unaf-
fected. 
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tion operations. This implies an asymmetric causality in monetary policy making. While monetary 
policy operations of the Euro Area and the US primarily steer domestic money market conditions, 
monetary policy operations of emerging market central banks tend to respond to changes in liquid-
ity conditions usually generated by concerns over exchange rate stability. 
2.2 Creditor Central Banks 
The working mechanism of monetary policy by creditor central banks and the respective impact on 
the central bank’s balance sheets can be explained by referring to the stylized central bank balance 
sheet as shown in Table 1. The European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve issue base money 
by independent decisions on open market operations which supply liquidity to the financial system. 
As the economy grows, the central bank increases its volume of open market operations on the asset 
side of its balance sheet. On the liability side currency in circulation expands. Liquidity is mainly 
provided by increases of low-risk domestic assets based on outright purchases of domestic govern-
ment bonds, repurchase agreements (repos) or collateralized lending to banks. Foreign assets remain 
widely unchanged.  
Figure 1 shows the development of the most important balance sheet items for the Eurosystem since 
1999. The balance sheet consolidates the balance sheets of national central banks participating in 
the European monetary union. The – in comparison to the US – large stock of foreign reserves is 
mostly due to the past history of exchange rate stabilization under the Bretton Woods System and 
the European Monetary System. Net foreign assets are the main autonomous factor on the asset 
side. Changes of the net foreign assets, however, are mainly driven by valuation changes because 
the Eurosystem as a large and independently floating area hardly intervenes in the foreign exchange 
market.4  
Currency in circulation and government deposits are the main autonomous factors on the liability 
side and the sum of both exceed net foreign assets. In fact, even without government deposits as an 
autonomous factor, currency in circulation exceeds net foreign assets and therefore puts the Euro-
system in a creditor position. Thus, the Eurosystem faces a liquidity deficit and open market opera-
tions on the asset side such as repos and collateralized lending are the main liquidity providing in-
                                                                                                                                                                  
3  For a similar definition of autonomous factors see ECB Monthly Bulletin, July 2001, p. 42. 
4   Since the start of the monetary union in 1999, the Eurosystem has only intervened in autumn 2000 in the foreign 
exchange market. Three consecutive interventions aimed at strengthening the euro against the dollar.   
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struments, whereas currency in circulation is the main liquidity absorbing item and expands to-
gether with open market operations on the asset side.5  
Apart from currency in circulation, other items on the liability side are shown as negative figures in 
Figure 1. Reserve requirements develop steadily reflecting the fact that the reserve ratio has re-
mained constant since the creation of the Eurosystem. Minimum reserves in the Eurosystem con-
tribute to the institutional framework of monetary policy implementation by stabilizing interest 
rates in the money market and enlarging the structural liquidity shortage. In contrast to open market 
operations they are not used for actively implementing changes in the monetary policy stance. The 
size of government deposits is small, as many national central banks within the Eurosystem only 
provide essential fiscal agent functions to their governments, whereas most other banking services 
to the government are provided by commercial banks.  
Table 1: Stylized Central Bank Balance Sheet 
Assets Liabilities & Capital  
1. Net Foreign Assets (incl. gold) 
 
3. Base Money 
  3.1 Currency in circulation 
  3.2 Deposits of commercial banks 
      3.2.1 Required reserves 
          3.2.1.1 Domestic currency 
          3.2.1.2 Foreign currency 
      3.2.2 Other deposits of commercial banks 
2. Domestic Assets 
2.1 Claims on central government 
   2.1.1 Securities 
      2.1.1.1 OMO: outright purchases 
       2.1.1.2 Purchased by other procedures  
   2.1.2 Others: loans, advances 
2.2 Claims on the banks 
   2.2.1 OMO: repos, collateralized lending 
   2.2.2 Others: credit, bail-out operations 
2.3 Claims on private sector 
  2.4 Other assets   
4. OMO: Debt securities sold  
5. Liabilities to banks  
    5.1 OMO: reverse repos, deposit taking auctions  
    5.2 Others 
6. Government deposits 
7. Other liabilities 
8. Capital and reserves 
Note: OMO = open market operations.  
The Eurosystem provides an example of a typical creditor central bank, because the central bank 
faces a liquidity deficit in the domestic banking system which is mainly created and enlarged by the 
demand for currency. In this monetary policy setting, domestic interest rates are the operational 
targets of monetary policy which is primarily conducted with respect to domestic targets such as 
domestic price stability and growth. International capital flows and exchange rates are allowed to 
                                                 
5  Euro cash was introduced in January 2002. Since then, the stock of currency in circulation is steadily increasing. 
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adjust freely to these “exogenous” interest rate changes. As a result, exchange rate volatility both in 
terms of levels and day-to-day returns is high. As the interest rate decisions of creditor central banks 
are primarily focused on domestic targets, foreign exchange intervention is rare. When it takes place 
it is sterilized because unsterilized intervention would impair the independence of domestic mone-
tary policy making.6
Figure 1: Consolidated Balance Sheet of the Eurosystem (1999-2006) 
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2.3 Debtor Central Banks 
Foreign versus domestic assets 
The causality in monetary policy operations by debtor central banks tends to be reverse compared to 
monetary policy operations by creditor central banks. Creditor central banks independently decide 
on monetary policy and therefore conduct their liquidity management usually by aiming at a domes-
                                                 
6  In line with this assumption, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York which is in charge of US foreign exchange 
intervention sterilizes its foreign exchange intervention automatically, fully and instantaneously (Cross 1998: 93). 
The European Central Bank takes foreign exchange intervention into account within the monetary policy operations 
of the same maintenance period.  
 9
tic short-term interest rates as an operational target. Monetary policy operations by debtor central 
banks tend to react to exchange rate concerns which play a dominant role. Foreign exchange inter-
ventions against appreciation pressure on the domestic currency lead to autonomous increases of 
liquidity due to increases of net foreign assets. Monetary policy operations then react and sterilize 
excess liquidity created by foreign exchange interventions.  
Foreign exchange inflows can be driven by several factors such as foreign direct investment, short-
term capital inflows attracted by high interest rates, remittances (as in Jordan or Lebanon) or current 
account surpluses (as in the oil exporting countries). As foreign exchange inflows lead to apprecia-
tion pressure the central banks of emerging markets tend to intervene in the foreign exchange mar-
ket thereby creating liquidity.  The central banks may react to “exchange rate driven” liquidity crea-
tion by sterilization operations because they attempt to reach two goals at the same time: (1) Ex-
change rate stability as well as (2) price and / or financial stability.  
This general pattern can be observed in many emerging market economies and is also reflected in 
the balance sheets of the MENA central banks. Typical debtor central banks such as the central 
bank of Jordan in our sample face a liquidity surplus in the domestic banking system which is cre-
ated by foreign exchange market interventions. Net foreign assets are the main liquidity providing 
autonomous factor and exceed currency in circulation as the main autonomous liquidity absorbing 
autonomous factor. In the face of foreign exchange inflows, net foreign assets on the asset side of 
the central bank balance sheet increase. If the reserve accumulation remains fully unsterilized 
changes in the stock of foreign reserves correspond to changes in base money. Then the liquidity 
supply to the domestic economy can become “excessive” and the central bank may decide to with-
draw liquidity from the market by sterilization operations.  
Additionally, the size of the liquidity surplus will not only depend on the size of autonomous factors 
on the asset side, but also on the size of autonomous factors on the liability side that absorb liquid-
ity. The autonomous liquidity demand will be comparatively high in countries with a (history) of a 
sound macroeconomic environment and therefore a low degree of currency substitution. In this 
case, currency in circulation will be relatively high and increasing. In contrast, in countries with a 
long history of macroeconomic instability and inflation domestic transactions may be widely based 
on international currencies. Then, as for instance in Lebanon or Israel, currency in circulation will 
be relatively low and hardly change with economic activity. Comparatively small liquidity expan-
sions as created by foreign exchange interventions or fiscal financing will then create a compara-
tively large amount of surplus liquidity.  
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Therefore, a debtor central bank can also emerge in countries that face balance of payments deficits 
over some years, as long as the accumulated level of autonomous factors on the asset side, e.g. net 
foreign assets, exceeds autonomous factors on the liability side, e.g. currency in circulation. The 
level of foreign reserves may not emerge endogenously by foreign exchange inflows and exchange 
rate concerns, but it can be guided by an adequacy measure for foreign reserves. Given a suffi-
ciently low demand for domestic currency, net foreign reserves can then quickly outweigh currency 
in circulation and even interventions that only have accumulated a minimum adequate level of for-
eign reserves, have already created a liquidity surplus in the domestic banking system.  
Finally and in addition to the liquidity creation due to reserve accumulation central banks in emerg-
ing market economies may create (excessive) liquidity by purchasing government bonds. In this 
case domestic assets become a major liquidity providing autonomous factor. For instance, in Egypt, 
a substantial part of central bank assets consist of government bonds, which – in contrast to creditor 
central banks – do usually not reflect monetary policy operations but a form of fiscal financing.7 
Liquidity creation takes place by non-monetary policy operations on the asset side, i.e. fiscal and 
quasi-fiscal operations. If this operation puts price stability at risk, the central bank partly absorbs 
liquidity by monetary policy operations on the liability side. 
Liquidity Absorbing Transactions 
There are different forms of liquidity-absorbing monetary policy operations which are reflected on 
the liability side of the stylized central bank balance sheet in Table 1. 8  Item 3.2 includes “required 
reserves” (item 3.2.1) and “other deposits of commercial banks” (item 3.2.2). These other deposits 
of commercial banks can simply reflect excess reserves and thereby signal an unabsorbed liquidity 
surplus. Additionally, item 3.2.2 can include more market-oriented monetary policy instruments 
other than required reserves such as deposit facilities. Banks can use deposit facilities on their own 
initiative to place excess liquidity at a given interest rate at the central bank. Deposit facilities are 
therefore more market-oriented than required reserves, which often are not remunerated. Open mar-
ket operations are considered as the most market-oriented monetary policy instruments and are re-
flected in item 4 and 5.1 (i.e. debt securities issued, reverse repos, or deposit taking auctions). They 
usually bear an interest rate that is close to a market rate.9  
                                                 
7  In general the central banks of emerging markets and developing countries will prefer to hold the bonds of the large 
industrial countries rather than domestic governments bonds, because US or euro area bonds are less risky assets. 
8  For an overview of monetary policy operations see Bindseil (2005). 
9  These forms of market-based sterilization operations are for instance widely used by the central banks in Central and 
Eastern Europe that intend to join the European Monetary Union and therefore have adopted market oriented princi-
ples. 
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Because the rate of return of market oriented central bank sterilization instruments competes with 
other investment opportunities of commercial banks, the interest rate paid on market based steriliza-
tion instruments needs to be close to the domestic market interest rate level. The downsides of mar-
ket-oriented sterilization instruments can be substantial sterilization costs, in particular if the inter-
est rate differential between emerging market economies and reserve currency countries is positive 
and high. Sterilization costs can have an impact on the financial soundness of the central bank. 
Eventually the central bank independence can be affected if sterilization costs erode the central 
banks’ capital base (Schobert 2006a). 
Less costly ways to sterilize are reserve requirements. Central banks can use an active reserve re-
quirement policy in order to absorb liquidity. It is less costly, because central banks can determine 
the respective remuneration rate discretionarily or often decide not to remunerate it at all. The 
downside is that increasing and changing reserve requirements will lead to higher and more volatile 
interest rates and even financial disintermediation. As commercial banks may tend to circumvent 
reserve requirements with low remuneration the central bank may be forced to successively broaden 
the reserve base. 
Alternatively, government deposits held at the central bank can restrict liquidity growth in the do-
mestic banking system. Government deposits are usually regarded as an autonomous factor on the 
central banks’ balance sheet in large industrial countries. In some countries, government deposits 
can nevertheless function like quasi-monetary policy operations, as changes in government deposits 
actively assist the liquidity management of the central bank. This instrument is prevalent in coun-
tries, in which the government receives a major share of the inflows in foreign currency. For exam-
ple the revenues can originate from oil exports such as in Algeria and Iran, and are placed at so 
called stabilization funds held at the central bank.  
Also large privatization receipts of the government can be deposited at the central bank to avoid 
undue liquidity expansion as for example in Tunisia in 2006. In both cases a close cooperation be-
tween the central bank and the fiscal authorities is necessary as the degree of sterilization will 
strongly hinge on government decisions in preserving the central banks’ desired liquidity condi-
tions. This can also be regarded as a downside, because an independent central bank rather conducts 
its liquidity management without cooperating with the government.10 The costs of this alternative 
way of restricting liquidity growth will correspond to the remuneration of the government deposits, 
if the deposits are interest-bearing.  
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3. Monetary Policy Operations at Debtor Central Banks in MENA Countries  
3.1. Overview and Data 
The country study on debtor central banks in the MENA region includes Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Is-
rael, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. Energy exports 
play a major role in Algeria, Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, which belong to the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) as well as for Syria and Egypt, which are major non-OPEC 
oil exporting countries.11 Exchange rates in these six countries as well as in Jordan and Lebanon are 
pegged or tightly managed to the US dollar, Tunisia and Morocco peg or tightly manage their cur-
rencies to a basket including the euro. Turkey and Israel officially claim floating exchange rates 
within an inflation targeting framework.  
The central bank balance sheet data are collected from the financial statements of central banks or 
other statistical publications of the respective central bank with the exception of net foreign assets. 
Net foreign assets are calculated by using data for monetary authorities from the International Fi-
nancial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund. To compare the structural differences across 
countries and over time we present annual data of the most important balance sheet items from 
1997 until 2006 (depending on data availability). They include currency in circulation, net foreign 
assets, monetary policy operations, banks’ and government deposits and – if applicable – other li-
quidity creating operations such as fiscal or quasi-fiscal operations.  
Generally, required reserves are used as liquidity-absorbing monetary policy instruments by all cen-
tral banks of the sample. All central banks apart from Syria and Saudi Arabia report market-based 
sterilization operations, though the size and activity differs largely cross section and over time (see 
Figures 2 to 4). Government deposits play an important role on the central banks’ balance sheets in 
Algeria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. Fiscal operations on the asset side are reflected in the bal-
ance sheet item “claims to the government”. They usually include direct advances to the govern-
ment, i.e. lending for budgetary purposes, or outright purchases of government securities for mone-
tary policy purposes. The item “claims to banks” can emerge, even if the banking system on aggre-
gate is in a liquidity surplus. It either reflects a malfunctioning of the interbank market in case of 
open market operations or often bail-out operations or preferential loans to individual banks in case 
of other credit operations.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
10  Therefore, many national central banks in the Eurosystem, rather prefer government deposits to be held at commer-
cial banks and only hold low levels of government deposits in order to fulfill essential fiscal agent functions.  
11  Egypt is a growing gas producer. 
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3.2 Country Analysis 
 
Algeria, Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia 
 
The balance sheets of the central banks of Algeria, Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia as shown in Fig-
ure 2 reflect that these OPEC countries and depend heavily on oil export revenues. On the asset side 
of the central bank balance sheets net foreign assets are dominating.12 All four central banks are 
debtor central banks. Excess liquidity is mainly absorbed by reserve requirements and also by open 
market operations in case of Kuwait. 
 
In Algeria, Iran and Saudi Arabia, net foreign assets significantly increase together with govern-
ment deposits. Liquidity creation due to the inflow of oil-related foreign exchange revenues is re-
stricted by “parking” these revenues on government deposits. In case of Algeria and Iran, govern-
ment deposits reflect the working of the stabilization fund that exists in both countries since 2000 
(Amuzegar, 2005). Saudi-Arabia has not yet officially announced a stabilization fund. Liquidity 
creation from oil-related foreign exchange revenues is nevertheless restricted as government depos-
its increase with net foreign assets. Kuwait also uses a stabilization fund, however, it is not held at 
the central bank. Therefore, the increase of net foreign assets at the central bank under-represents 
the increase of foreign reserves holding due to oil-related foreign exchange revenues.   
 
Kuwait is the only OPEC country in the sample that has actively used open market operations, i.e. 
the sale of Central Bank of Kuwait bonds, over the recent years in order to sterilize excess liquid-
ity.13 In Iran the increase in net foreign assets is augmented by the increase of claims to the gov-
ernment. Despite high oil revenues, Iran continues to face budgetary pressures, which presumably 
have forced the central bank into financing the government.  
 
12  In Kuwait foreign reserves declined temporarily following the first gulf war.  
13  A positive side effect of this sterilization operation is that such central bank bond sales contribute to develop a do-
mestic money market. 
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Figure 2: Central Bank Balance Sheets: Algeria, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia 
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Tunisia 
As shown in the upper left panel of Figure 3 the asset side of the balance sheet of the Central Bank 
of Tunisia is dominated by foreign assets which have increased substantially since 2001 and exceed 
currency in circulation. The Central Bank of Tunisia has only marginally embarked into steriliza-
tion operations. Open market operations have only emerged over the last years; they have a small 
volume and are liquidity providing, i.e. outright purchases of treasury bills, or liquidity absorbing 
operations, i.e. the sale of central banks debt securities. Thus, open market operations are not sys-
tematically used to absorb a structural liquidity surplus in the domestic banking sector. 
In particular in the year 2006 liquidity creation by increases in net foreign assets due to the sale of 
state shares in Tunisie Telecom is restricted by increasing a special government account. The for-
eign currency revenues were deposited on a pending account of the government that is reported as 
an adjustment item on the liability side of the central bank balance sheet not shown in Figure 3. 
Furthermore, the item liabilities to banks that emerged since 2004 includes foreign currency-
denominated borrowing of the Central Bank of Tunisia in the money market and sight deposits of 
Tunisian authorized financial intermediaries. It restricts liquidity growth due to increasing net for-
eign assets.  
Fiscal and quasi-fiscal operations are reflected in the items “claims to the government” and “claims 
to firms”. Claims to the government mainly include direct advances to the state. 14 Claims to gov-
ernment-related firms, namely claims on the National Oil Board and Cereal Board, were purchased 
from the National Agricultural Bank in 1996 and have continuously lost value. 
 
14 The major share of direct advances is an advance to the state for Tunisia’s capital subscription at the International 
Monetary Fund and the Arab Monetary Fund. A small part of the direct advances is restructured old public debt, on 
which the state pays preferential interest rates. 
 17 
Figure 3: Central Bank Balance Sheets: Tunisia, Turkey, Egypt, Morocco 
-2,000
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
T
N
D
 
m
i
l
l
i
o
n
Claims on firms
Liabilities to banks in foreign currency
Government deposits
OMO: Debt securities sold
Deposits of banks
Claims on government: advances
OMO: outright purchases of treasury bills
Net foreign assets
Currency in circulation
 
Tunisia 
-60.000
-40.000
-20.000
0
20.000
40.000
60.000
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
t
r
i
l
l
i
o
n
 
T
u
r
k
i
s
h
 
l
i
r
a
 
 
 
.
OMO:  reverse repos & IMM
Government deposits
Other deposits of banks
Required reserves
Claims on government: bonds
Net foreign assets
OMO: repos
Currency in circulation
 
Turkey 
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
b
i
l
l
i
o
n
 
E
g
y
p
t
i
a
n
 
p
o
u
n
d
s
 
 
.
Claims on government: others
Government deposits
OMO
Other deposits of banks
Required reserves
Claims on government: securities
Net foreign assets
Currency in circulation
Egypt 
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
250
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
b
i
l
l
i
o
n
 
D
i
r
h
a
m
s
 
 
.
Claims on banks: credits
Government deposits
OMO: Liquidity withdrawal  account
Deposits of banks
Claims on government: mainly advances
Net foreign assets
Currency in circulation
 
Morocco 
Source: National Central Banks, IMF. 
Turkey 
The central bank balance sheet of Turkey as shown in the upper right panel of Figure 3 shows that 
claims on the government play a dominant role on the asset side. During the 2000/ 2001 financial 
crisis, net foreign assets became negative and the central bank supported the financial system with 
exceptional financing based on liquidity providing open market operations and substantial pur-
chases of government bonds, which can be mainly regarded as fiscal operations.15 Thus, both net 
foreign assets and claims to the government are major autonomous factors on the asset side, which 
exceed currency in circulation and thereby put the Central Bank of Turkey into a debtor position.  
On the liability side remunerated required reserves, reverse repos and interbank money market 
(IMM) transactions have been used as liquidity absorbing instruments. The size of these steriliza-
tion instruments has increased considerably since 2000. During the crisis, however, the central bank 
provided and absorbed liquidity by conducting both types of open market operations, which signals 
the malfunctioning of the interbank market during this time period. 
Egypt 
The balance sheet structure of the Central Bank of Egypt is shown in the lower left panel of Figure 
3. Although on the asset side foreign reserves have increased substantially the dominating liquidity 
creating items are claims to the government, in particular in form of government security holdings. 
Part of the large stock of government securities held on the central banks’ balance sheets is due to 
outright purchases of the central bank on the primary market and can therefore be regarded as fiscal 
financing.16   
The substantial increase of assets is matched by a substantial rise of liquidity absorbing items on the 
liability side of the balance sheet. Required reserves and other central bank deposits of commercial 
banks have been traditionally the most important liquidity absorbing instruments, but the relative 
size has decreased over time. Since 2003, sterilization is increasingly conducted by OMOs, e.g. 
outright sales of bonds, deposit-taking auctions and – since 2005 – by selling debt instruments (CDs 
                                                 
15  At the Central Bank of Turkey direct advances to the government were already banned in 1997. However, a major 
part of the position “claims on government: bonds” consists of restructured public financing during the crisis 
(Schobert 2006b). This portfolio largely bears returns below market rates. 
16 The central bank finances for example, cash deficits on government accounts at the central bank (Annual Report of 
the Central Bank of Egypt, 2002-2003, 32). 
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and Central Bank of Egypt notes) to domestic banks.17 Also the size of government deposits at the 
central bank has increased over time. 
Morocco 
The balance sheet of the Central Bank of Morocco is shown in the lower right panel of Figure 3. 
Given tight exchange rate stabilization based on a currency basket and vivid foreign exchange in-
flows net foreign reserves have increased substantially since the year 2000 and are the main liquid-
ity providing autonomous factor. 
The liquidity created by foreign reserve accumulation has been partially sterilized by small-scale 
OMOs, i.e. deposit-taking operations placed on so called liquidity withdrawal accounts as well as 
required reserves included in the item “banks deposits”. Despite an aggregate liquidity surplus some 
banks conduct bilateral credit operations with the Bank of Morocco. Claims on the government 
mainly consist of advances although the size is even smaller than claims to banks.  
Jordan 
Given a tight dollar peg and vivid foreign exchange inflows Jordan has accumulated a large stock of 
foreign reserves on the asset side of the central bank balance sheet. Net foreign assets are therefore 
the main liquidity providing autonomous factor on the asset side and exceed currency in circula-
tion.18  
In contrast to other central banks in the region, a large part of liquidity-absorbing transactions take 
place in open market operations for instance by the sale of Certificates of Deposits (CDs). In addi-
tion required reserves have absorbed liquidity from the domestic money markets. Despite a liquidity 
surplus in the total domestic banking system, some banks conduct bilateral credit operations with 
the Central Bank of Jordan (a major share of claims to banks are reported as bail-out operations). 
                                                 
17  Since June 2005 the central bank has also implemented an interest rate corridor for the interbank market which has 
considerably stabilized money market rates (see Annual Report of the Central Bank of Egypt, 2005-2006). 
18 In comparison to the foreign reserves, other liquidity providing items of the asset side of the balance sheet such as 
claims on the government and commercial banks are small and have hardly changed during the observation period. 
Claims to banks consist of advances and a special government bond. This non-interest bearing bond was issued by 
the Ministry of Finance to the order of the central bank in accordance to a special law in 1992 that deals with the set-
tlement of extraordinary advances (Annual report of the Bank of Jordan 2005, 122). 
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Syria 
The Central Bank of Syria discloses little information on its balance sheet positions which are 
shown in the upper right panel of Figure 4. Since 1998 liquidity has been mainly created by the ac-
cumulation of foreign reserves. Together with net foreign assets, claims to the government and to 
commercial bank can be regarded as autonomous factors on the asset side, however, they have not 
changed substantially. Furthermore, claims on the government on the asset side are matched by 
government deposits of similar size on the liability side. Sterilization mainly takes place by mini-
mum reserve holdings, which have increased over the sample period.  
Lebanon 
As shown in the lower left panel of Figure 4, the Banque du Liban reports an extremely large stock 
of foreign reserves in relation to currency in circulation. Due to a high degree of dollarization the 
demand for domestic currency is comparatively low. Liquidity creation either by the accumulation 
of foreign reserves or by purchases of government securities as the two most important autonomous 
factors on the asset side increase the liquidity surplus in the domestic banking system. 
In 2003, the increase of net foreign assets and government securities reflects the impact of the Paris 
II conference. The objective of Paris II was to seek support of the international community to alle-
viate the burden of the public debt and to reverse the macroeconomic and fiscal imbalances of the 
Lebanese economy. According to the Ministry of Finance the conference resulted in 10.1 billion 
dollars of grants and loans for the Lebanese government. 2.4 billion dollars were provided by seven 
lending countries, 3.6 billion dollars by commercial banks operating in Lebanon and 4.1 billion 
dollars from a Central Bank scheme19, which is reflected in the increase of government securities 
on the asset side of the central bank balance sheet.  
In addition to large official inflows related to Paris II, private capital inflows surged in 2003 which 
contributed to the increase in net foreign assets on the central banks’ balance sheet. Liquidity ab-
sorbing items are included in the item bank deposits, of which the structure is not further disclosed. 
They include reserve requirements and presumably also certificates of deposits which the Banque 
du Liban uses to sterilize excess liquidity.  
 
19  See www.forlebanon.net/bio.htm. 
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Figure 4: Central Bank Balance Sheets: Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Israel 
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Israel 
Due to the fact that the Bank of Israel has not intervened in the foreign exchange market since 1997, 
the level of net foreign assets has remained broadly unchanged. Nevertheless, foreign reserves re-
main the dominating autonomous factor on the asset side of the balance sheet as shown in the lower 
right panel of Figure 4. Similar to Lebanon, foreign reserves are very high compared to currency in 
circulation due to a high degree of dollarization. The constantly low demand for domestic currency 
prevents the central bank to escape from its debtor situation, even though it does not create addi-
tional liquidity by foreign exchange intervention and only to a limited extent by credit operations 
with banks.20  
Liquidity-absorbing open market operations consist of required reserves, deposit-taking auctions 
and debt securities sold, so called makam. Debt security sales have become the dominating steriliza-
tion instrument over the last years. According to the Short-Term Loan Law 5744–1984 the govern-
ment is authorized to issue bonds to be sold only to the Bank of Israel. Theoretically the Bank of 
Israel buys and sells these bonds from and to the public to regulate liquidity. In practice, makam 
have been mainly used for soaking up excess liquidity. 21  
The government is obligated to deposit the entire proceeds of these bonds sales in the Bank of Israel 
and may not use the proceeds for anything apart from repaying the loan or paying the interest on it. 
The balance of makam shown in the balance sheet reflects the redemption value of bills held by the 
public less the balance of the discount not yet amortized (Bank of Israel, Financial Statements 
2005).  
4. Conclusions 
The asymmetric incentive for exchange rate stabilization in anchor currency countries and in 
emerging market countries is reflected in both the balance sheets of central banks and in monetary 
policy operations in both groups of countries. While the European Central Bank und the Federal 
Reserve as creditor central banks provide liquidity based on different kinds of open market opera-
tions the central banks of emerging market economies mainly supply liquidity by purchasing for-
                                                 
20  The small size of direct lending to banks also includes bail-out operations. Claims on the government mainly include 
a portfolio of tradable securities and long-term advances that were made until 1988. 
21 On 28 Feb 2007 the Bank of Israel announced to use makam as an active monetary tool: After more than a decade of 
gradually expanding the quantity of makam in order to establish it as a monetary instrument, the Bank of Israel will 
begin using makam for restoring or soaking up liquidity according to circumstances (Bank of Israel 2007, Recent 
Economic Developments, 117) 
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eign assets and sometimes by increasing claims to the government due to fiscal financing. As the 
liquidity resulting from foreign exchange interventions (and fiscal operations) tends to be excessive 
to maintain price and / or financial stability, debtor central banks partly absorb liquidity by steriliza-
tion. This implies an asymmetric causality in monetary policy making. In the balance sheet of a 
typical debtor central bank net foreign assets increase in the face of high foreign exchange inflows 
while on the liability side sterilization instruments such as required reserves and liquidity absorbing 
open market operations increase.  
In the group of MENA countries the central banks are typical debtors to the domestic banking sys-
tem. This is most evident in the central bank balance sheets of Jordan and Morocco. The central 
banks in oil exporting countries such as Algeria, Iran and Saudia Arabia as well as the central bank 
of Tunisia can be seen as another type of debtor central bank as they restrict liquidity increases due 
to foreign exchange inflows by placing these inflows on government deposits at the central bank. 
This kind of sterilization requires a close cooperation of the central bank and the government with 
respect to monetary policy targets. In Kuwait the sterilization of oil revenues partly takes place via a 
sterilization fund outside the central bank. In addition the central bank uses open market operations 
as sterilization instruments.  
Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey represent countries, in which – in addition to reserve accu-
mulation - fiscal operations have contributed to surplus liquidity which can be linked to sterilization 
operations. Additionally, in Lebanon and Israel, the debtor position of the central bank is further 
enhanced due to high dollarization and a correspondingly low demand for domestic currency. Even 
without creating additional liquidity by increasing autonomous factors on the asset side, it will 
therefore be difficult for these central banks to change their debtor position into a creditor position.  
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